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The Stoic Monastic: Taiwanese
Buddhism and the Problem of
Emotions
Hillary CRANE

Abstract
This paper explores the stoicism of Taiwanese monastics and argues that,
in this context, emotions are believed to be dangerous in part because
they interfere with spiritual cultivation. A stoic exterior further represents
an inner state of calm and a lack of emotionality. Since women are
believed to have more emotional problems than men, nuns in particular
seek to control their emotions, in part by studying the example of monks.
Women’s emotions are contrasted with the trait of compassion, which is
associated with men and thought to be selfless. Cultivating compassion is
the focus of much of their spiritual practice and at the center of the vow
taking ceremony, wherein they burn scars into their foreheads, signaling
their compassion and willingness to endure the world’s suffering, and
also concretizing the abstract emotion of compassion through bodily
pain.

Introduction1
Taiwanese Buddhist monastics have a stoic demeanor. They are quite
serious and rarely joke or smile, unlike Buddhist monastics in many other
parts of Asia. They wear grey and black, they walk with perfect posture,
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and they rarely smile. In contrast to many images of Buddhism familiar to
Westerners, such as the frequently seen images of the rotund Maitreya or
monks in other parts of Asia who tell jokes or seem giddy, Taiwanese
monastics can at first seem dour and humorless. Looks can be deceiving,
however, and while Taiwanese monastics are certainly earnest, it would be
a disservice to describe them as uniformly cold and unwelcoming. Once I
got to know them, during my ethnographic field research at a large
monastery in central Taiwan, I found that they could be quite funny,
especially one on one but also when lecturing to a large community. Many
Taiwanese monastics are in fact quite charming, particularly those who
hold leadership positions that involve a great deal of lay community
exposure. One nun I took meditation classes from at an urban branch
meditation center was one of the most charismatic people I have ever
encountered; her charisma was most clearly evinced by the large number of
lay people who decided to take up the monastic life after being inspired by
her ease and charm while taking her classes. Nevertheless, the majority of
Taiwanese Buddhist monastics are quite serious and embody stoicism.
They exude self-control, not only in their calm, impassive faces, but also in
their gait and posture.2
Although all monastics have the same basic appearance — the
same clothing, countenance, and shaved head — those who have taken
their final vows also have three coin-sized scars burned into their
scalps just above their foreheads. For those who took their final vows
some time ago, these are pale scars whose color stands out even when the
head is freshly shaved, but even more so when surrounded by stubble.
When the scars are new, they appear quite painful as scabs that are plain to
see. They serve as reminders of the Bodhisattva vow to endure limitless
pain to ensure the liberation of all sentient beings from the wheel of
reincarnation.
In this paper I explore what these aspects of monastic appearance
reveal about monastics’ need both to control their emotions and to cultivate
compassion, and I situate each aspect in different discourses within the
literature on the anthropology of emotion. I argue first that stoicism has
different meanings here than in other cultural contexts. Second, I show that
emotions are perceived as dangerous in the monastery, but for different
reasons than in other Chinese contexts, and that they are particularly
dangerous for women. Finally, I argue that compassion can be written on
the body and, through physical pain and scarification, one’s lived
experience of emotion can be dramatically altered.
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Emotional Mastery
In this section, I examine self-mastery cross-culturally, and subsequently
show that the Taiwanese monastic context holds different expectations and
assigns different meanings to stoicism than those of other societies. By
comparing the monastic emphasis on self-control with anthropological
literature from other contexts where emotional self-mastery is lauded, I
examine larger questions of what it means to be in control of one’s
emotions in the monastery context — where showing any emotion, even
joy, would reveal that one can be affected by emotion.

Emotional Mastery in Cross-Cultural Perspective
Anthropological studies of other communities suggest that self-control
over one’s emotions is a central value in many societies. In these societies,
the importance of the appearance of emotional self-control is a common
trait, and the meaning of self-control and the value given to the emotional
content that is restrained is also quite similar. However, as I show below,
Taiwanese Buddhist monastics differ considerably from other cultural
contexts where emotional self-mastery is encouraged.
Michelle Rosaldo’s (1980) study of the Ilongot of the mountainous
forests of the Philippines analyses their cultural beliefs about emotion
including the value of self-control. Rosaldo discusses in depth the native
concept of liget, which could be rendered in English several ways
including as “heat,” “anger,” or “energy.” It connotes a depth and power to
feeling which is amplified in key emotional times, such as in grief.
Although liget is highly valued, it is also thought best tempered by beya, a
concept akin to the English word wisdom and which Rosaldo translates as
“knowledge.” Beya serves to balance liget and channel it in appropriate
directions. This balancing of beya and liget can happen within one
individual; on a headhunting raid, for instance, beya comes into play,
keeping energy and excitement (liget) in check and providing one with the
patience to remain hidden. It can also work between individuals or between
groups of people, as when elders use their beya to reign in the liget of the
young. Both qualities are desired, but the beya serves to keep the liget from
amplifying beyond control. If liget is understood as the force of powerful
emotions, beya is the strength and mastery to keep liget appropriately
channeled.
On the Pacific atoll of Ifalk, Catherine Lutz (1988) found that two
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emotions were particularly highly valued — metagu (fear or anxiety) and
song (“righteous anger”). Unlike Western societies, which privilege
thought over emotion (and values those who can use rationality to control
emotion), on Ifalk, no distinction is made between thought and emotion.
Repiy (social intelligence) enables one to experience metagu, song, and
other proper thought-emotions, which serve to promote correct moral
action. Metagu keeps one appropriately subordinate to authority, while
song similarly serves to channel thought-emotion in culturally approved
directions. Repiy provides one the moral judgment to control which
thought-emotions are acted upon, providing valued self-control.
‘Agl, or “reason,” provides emotional control for the Bedouin society
of Awlad ‘Ali studied by Lila Abu-Lughod (1986). According to AbuLughod, for this community the use of ghinn‚wa poetry allows one to
reveal profound feelings in a culturally condoned way that demonstrates
that one has ‘agl and, therefore, the self-mastery to not be overwhelmed by
emotion. Ghinn‚wa differs sharply from emotionally revealing behavior;
both point to profound emotions, but where the latter causes one to lose
honor, the former enables one to gain honor, by revealing the extent and
depth of the emotion being restrained by ‘agl. Whereas remaining stoic
says little in itself about emotional mastery (one might not be showing
emotion because one is not feeling anything profound), ghinn‚wa poems
reveal that the appearance of stoicism requires tremendous effort, because
of the depth of the feelings that are being hidden.
In each of these examples, emotional mastery gains its significance in
part because of what is restrained. Holding back emotions that are not
profound does not require (or reveal) strength of character, but feeling
something keenly and keeping that feeling from manifesting reveals great
self-control. Emotional self-control seems to earn its value in these
societies when it is thought to require effort because of the power of the
emotion being held back. In these contexts, feeling emotions does not
connote a character flaw, only failing to restrain them does; restraining or
appropriately channeling powerful emotions earns one respect and honor.
Reading Emotional Mastery in Taiwanese Buddhism
In contrast to the communities mentioned above, where one is lauded for
having the force to restrain strong emotions, for monastics an appearance
of calm is similarly important, but their outward appearance is supposed to
mirror an interior state of calm. Rather than appearing unaffected by strong
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emotions that exist below the surface, the point in this context is to not be
affected at all. Part of the spiritual practice in Taiwanese Buddhism
involves learning to feel less; what Taiwanese Buddhists value is stoicism
that demonstrates spiritual advancement to the point where one does not
get emotional at personal situations, rather than stoicism that keeps deep
and powerful emotions from being seen.
When explaining the goal of spiritual cultivation, and particularly of
exercises such as meditation, monastics often use the metaphor of an
internal sea. According to this metaphor, we all have a sea within us; our
true inner natures and the nature of reality would be visible to us if we
could see through the depths of this water, but the surface of the water gets
churned up with turbulent emotions and thoughts. Spiritual cultivation
helps us learn how to calm those waters, how to experience emotions less
forcefully, and how to control our thoughts, allowing us to reach that inner
state of calm that enables us to see below the surface of the seas inside.
At Zhi Guang Shan,3 a large Chan Buddhist monastery where I
conducted ethnographic field research, the importance of reducing the
force of one’s emotions was regularly discussed. My first encounter with
this kind of discourse beyond the metaphor described above was when I
visited the temple during a week-long silent meditation retreat. Although
we were not supposed to speak during the entire week, we were allowed to
seek out meditation guidance from one of the monastics leading the retreat.
My grandmother passed away days before I went on the retreat, and as a
result, I was distracted by my feelings of grief and thoughts about her
during meditation. I asked one of the nuns what I should do. She
encouraged me to rely on the counting method, which was the main
meditation technique taught at the temple, to train myself not to think about
her and not to feel the emotions of grief. Although clearly it was important
that I not demonstrably grieve, because to do so would disturb my fellow
retreaters, the emphasis of her meditation guidance was to teach me
techniques for preventing myself from feeling those emotions as strongly
or, better, from feeling them at all. Here, emotional restraint and an
appearance of calm were less important than actually learning to feel less.
While training oneself to feel less was something that the monastics
tried to teach to the lay community, it was also central to their own
practice. For example, shortly after moving into the monastery, I was in a
small room with about five nuns who were having tea. One was the
counselor for the monastery’s women’s college — a young, insightful nun
who the other nuns at the college (and to a lesser extent other nuns
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associated with the monastery) could seek out to discuss their problems.
She provided answers, usually based on dogma, to their concerns. On this
occasion, a nun sought her advice about a problem she was having: she
could not stop thinking about how desperately she wanted to become a
bodhisattva. Although this was of course a valid pursuit in this context, the
passion with which she felt the longing was judged inappropriate. She said
she knew that her desire was actually getting in the way of her progress.
She described not being able to meditate, eat, or even fall asleep without
thinking about how much she craved spiritual advancement. She said,
exasperated, “wo yizhi xiang ‘wo hao xiangyao cheng fo!’” (I constantly
think “I really want to become a Buddha!”), and began to quietly cry. This
was one of only two occasions on which I saw a nun cry, and both were
quite discomfiting; these two occasions were the only times I recall any
monastic appearing overwhelmed by an emotion.
The other nuns seemed to ignore the tears; even if they noticed them
falling, they certainly did not address them directly. One of the other nuns
reassured the crying nun that sometimes she had similar feelings and that
she understood how distracting they could be. The others weighed in with
suggestions for other things to concentrate on to make the feeling go away,
and this was the same approach that the counselor-nun took. She advised
that under circumstances in which her emotions overwhelm her, she should
draw on any of the many techniques taught at the monastery that serve to
reign in thoughts and emotions. Like the nun who had given me meditation
advice during the retreat, she recommended using the counting method in
order to have something else upon which to focus. She also recommended
that she nian fo (chant a buddha’s name) or recite sutras she had
memorized. (Everyone at the monastery, even the lay people, had
memorized the Heart Sutra; monastics had memorized quite a few more.)
Any of these methods would give her something to concentrate on to take
the vehemence out of the feeling and enable her to reach past it.
Many monastics mentioned this set of skills that aid in overcoming
emotions as one of the aspects of monastic life that they most appreciate.
Before they renounced the world, monastics would sometimes feel
overwhelmed by their own feelings; in the monastery they acquired the
ability to free themselves of the burdens of strong emotion.
Unlike in other societies, where a calm exterior garners one respect if
it suggests mastery over strong emotions, in the context of Taiwanese
Buddhism a calm exterior ideally reveals that one has mastery not over the
expression of emotion, but, more importantly, over whether one feels
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emotion at all. As I show below, their interest in not experiencing emotions
comes from the belief that emotions are dangerous because they interfere
with spiritual goals.

Dangerous Emotions
In this section I compare the threat posed by emotions in the monastic
context with the perception that emotion is dangerous in other Chinese
cultural contexts. Anthropologists who have looked at emotion in various
Chinese cultural contexts have drawn different conclusions about whether
Chinese consider emotions dangerous. I look at monastic stoicism in light
of these discussions and argue that Taiwanese Buddhist monastics believe
emotions interfere with the work of spiritual cultivation and they further
believe that the burden of emotion falls more heavily on women. I
demonstrate that with the important exception of compassion, emotions are
thought of negatively and associated with femininity, whereas overcoming
one’s emotions is seen as masculine and as a sign of spiritual advancement.
Monastics see compassion as the only emotion befitting a highly cultivated
spiritual state and see the compassionate bodhisattva as the model not only
for right action but also for right emotion.
Dangerous Emotions in Rural China
The monastic context is not unique in finding emotions dangerous.
Anthropologists of Chinese societies have repeatedly raised questions
about the possibility that Chinese consider emotions dangerous. Richard
Solomon, for example, claims that the Chinese he studied believe feelings
of hostility need to be concealed, especially when directed at authority
figures, and that emotions are dangerous (Solomon 1971: 63, in Potter
1988: 195). Arthur Kleinman has also written extensively about the danger
of “dysphoric” emotion and how Chinese somatize some emotions or
psychological states rather than experiencing or expressing them as
emotional: identifying as a headache or a tired feeling what someone in
another society may describe as feelings of sadness or depression (1980).
In her essay “The Cultural Construction of Emotion in Rural Chinese
Social Life,” Sulamith Heins Potter examines this literature in light of her
own ethnographic research, and concludes that emotions are not as
dangerous to Chinese people as many scholars have suggested. Potter
found that her field subjects regularly spoke openly about their emotions
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but that such discourse had little weight; emotion was largely ignored as
unimportant. In the Chinese context, she argues, unlike the American one,
social institutions are not built on the emotions of those involved.
[T]he Chinese believe that experienced emotion is irrelevant either to the
creation or to the perpetuation of social institutions of any kind. They certainly
recognize the existence of emotions, and are aware of them as aspects of
experience, but emotions are not thought of as significant in social relationships.
An emotion is never the legitimizing rationale for any socially significant action,
and there is no cultural theory that social structure rests on emotional ties.
(1988: 185)

In this context, a wife can complain openly about her unhappiness in
a marriage without threatening the social order, because marriage is not
thought to be built on a foundation of emotions. Her sentiments towards
her spouse bear little relationship to the success of her marriage if it is built
on other things. One can also complain angrily about the grief caused by
other social institutions, because no one expects social institutions to be
built on, or to supply, positive feeling. Rather than the individual’s
personal feelings supporting the social order, Chinese may assume the
social order will continue to exist without reference to inner feelings (1988:
194). Feelings are therefore personal and idiosyncratic rather than the
foundations on which social institutions rest. Negative feelings cannot
undermine that which was not expected to be built on positive feelings.
According to Potter, although feelings are recognized, they do not carry the
same weight or significance they do in American society. In contrast to the
conclusions of Solomon and Kleinman, Potter finds that that her field
subjects allow for the uncensored expression of negative emotions, but do
not talk about them as they are not seen as relevant.
Potter draws a strong contrast between the insignificance of negative
feelings and the weight given to emotions like love and affection which,
she says, can be dangerous.
As an experienced emotion, love has the intrinsic capacity to lend importance
to relationships, whether they have structural significance or not. Since the
patterns of preexistent structure have primary importance in Chinese social
relations, love is the rival and the potential enemy of structure. Rather than
affirming structure, love is understood to endanger it. Thus, in Chinese terms,
it is the emotion that most threatens the social order (1988: 199).

Potter describes the potential danger of affection in the Chinese
context in an example where one might expect that affection would not
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likely undermine the relationship — the relationship between a father and
a son. Affection is dangerous in this relationship because a father’s open
demonstration of his affection encourages his son to bridge the distance
their relationship is supposed to maintain and defy the formalized patterns
of respect and hierarchy on which their relationship is constituted. As
Potter says, “If love is openly expressed, the form and strength of the
relationship between father and son are thought to be damaged” (1988:
199). Unlike negative emotions, which Potter claims her field subjects do
not give any weight to, love and affection are dangerous because they can
lead to the crossing of distances necessary to maintain appropriate
relationships.
Potter’s argument is supported by other scholars of China. For
example, in From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society, Fei
Xiaotong explains the “obvious indifference between husbands and wives”
(1992 [1948]: 86) that he found in the countryside where, he says, the
smooth functioning of a marital relationship requires little communication
or affection. Friendship, affection, and intimacy are sought instead among
one’s peers. He argues that romantic or passionate love4 is a faulty ground
for a relationship. The “struggle to achieve an unending love makes social
relationships unstable” in part because it requires “continuously
discovering and overcoming obstacles” (1992 [1948]: 91). Like Potter, Fei
describes Chinese as treating this kind of feeling with suspicion, and not
desiring it in a relationship that is expected to stand the test of time.
Fei describes the problem of love and affection as stemming from their
interference with social institutions and work. When there is work to be
done, “groups must maintain discipline, and discipline necessarily
excludes personal sentiments” (Fei 1992 [1948]: 87). Fei further states,
in social relationships, such emotion can be used either for destructive or creative
purposes. The immediacy and excitement of emotions change the original
relationships. In other words, if one wants to maintain stable social relationships,
one needs to avoid situations that cause emotional agitation. In fact, indifference
is an indication of stable relationships (1992: 88).

Potter also writes that affection and love are problematic because they
interfere with work; this causes issues because, to Chinese, work is the
foundation of all social institutions. One can tell if a relationship is going
well or ill by how well it accomplishes its work, and how each member
describes the work of his or her partner, rather than by the feelings they
describe having for one another. When the relationship is not a success, its
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failures are expressed in terms of a partner’s inability or unwillingness to
work, rather than as an emotional lack:
The villagers described a wide variety of other relationships, and in every case
the capacity to work, rather than the capacity to feel, was what was significant.
Their descriptions of relationships that they, themselves, thought of as close
and loving were expressed as if the emotional aspects were not the relevant
ones. Rather, they would recast the discussion in a form of emphasizing the
willingness to work on the other’s behalf (Potter 1988: 203).

Where Americans use the litmus of emotion to test the validity of a
relationship, according to Potter, the idiom of work provides the terms by
which Chinese discuss their relationships.
Fei makes a similar argument, that Chinese believe that relationships
based on understanding (liaojie) rather than on emotions (ganqing) are
more successful (1992: 88) To Fei, the significance of this “understanding”
is that without it, one cannot get work done. For both authors, loving
emotions interfere with work — therein lies their danger. Rather than
seeing all emotions (or negative emotions) as dangerous, Potter and
Fei both conclude that the danger stems from affection’s potential
to undermine social institutions and the proper functioning of relationships.
Emotional Interference in a Taiwanese Monastery
At Zhi Guang, monastics have already severed their relationships with
their families. When they become monastics, they chujia, or leave home —
the expression chujia being a deeper expression of “leaving” that refers
both to their change of residence and to their having broken off their
familial relationships. Emotions cannot sustain or threaten relationships
that no longer exist; if the threat of emotion in both Potter and Fei’s
examples is that it undermines the work of relationships, no such threat can
(by chujia’s definition) exist in the monastic context. Emotions do pose a
threat here, although not to relationships. Although a Taiwanese monastery
presents a very different cultural context than the rural mainland
countryside described by Fei and Potter, the threat of emotions is not
entirely dissimilar from that which they describe — in both cultural
contexts, the fear is that emotions will interfere with work. For Potter, the
threat is only posed by loving emotions, because she is looking explicitly
at their effects on relationships; at the monastery, however, the threat is not
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to relationships, which have been severed. Nevertheless, all emotions pose
a risk to monastics’ ability to do the work required of them.
The main work of monastics is their spiritual cultivation. Their goal is
to achieve a spiritual state where they can be free from the wheel of
reincarnation.5 We are reincarnated, they believe, because we are still
attached to the things, people, and experiences of the world, and we
mistakenly believe these things provide happiness or satisfaction instead of
the suffering that is truly at their root. As described above, monastics are
working toward a calm state where they can gain greater spiritual insight,
which will enable them to progress toward their goal. Monastics have
many techniques to aid them in the spiritual cultivation which is their fulltime task. They believe emotions threaten the calm demeanor necessary to
achieve spiritual goals because, when one is distracted by pleasure or pain,
one finds it hard to concentrate on the task of spiritual cultivation. Rather
than learning to concentrate despite the distractions, monastics are taught
to rid themselves of such distractions altogether. Any distraction from their
cultivation, whether a powerful emotion, such as the desperation of the nun
described above to reach her spiritual goals, or merely the appearance of
distraction, is problematic.
On one occasion while I was living at the monastery, the nun who ran
the office in which I worked had to run some errands and she took another
lay woman and me along. We ran an errand in town and then she drove us
out to a nearby waterfall that she wanted me to see. When we got there,
though, there were some sightseers, so she would not get out of the car. The
lay woman and I only got out briefly because it was clear that the nun was
not comfortable being there when others also were there. I asked the lay
woman why the nun would not get out of the car. She explained that it
would be unseemly for the nun to appear to be enjoying herself, having
inappropriate fun. I also asked the nun, and she gave me the same answer.
I did not think seeing a waterfall was very risqué, but they both told me that
monastics are supposed to be constantly concerned with their cultivation
and not distracted by anything, even something as innocuous as enjoying a
waterfall. Even this simple pleasure, they felt, was inappropriate in a
religious person who should neither show emotions nor appear distracted
from the task of spiritual cultivation.6
For monastics, the threat of emotions may not be too dissimilar from
that suggested by Potter and Fei. While emotions clearly do not pose the
risk they do in other contexts, of getting in the way of the proper ordering
of things and the work that establishes and maintains relationships, they do
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pose a risk in that they involve monastics in worldly distractions, keeping
them from the work of their spiritual cultivation.
Gendered Stoicism
While maintaining a stoic appearance and mastery over emotions is
important for all monastics, the monastics with whom I lived frequently
explained to me that this was more challenging for nuns than monks.
Taiwanese monastics believe women suffer greater emotional burdens than
men, particularly before they become monastics. At the monastery,
emotions are associated with women and with womanly behavior and are
most often raised in the context of discussions of gender difference.
Assertions about women’s emotionality are based in Buddhist texts
read and studied at the monastery. Texts such as The Book of Gradual
Sayings describe women as particularly susceptible to emotion:
In the morning a woman stays at home with heart haunted by the taint of
stinginess. At noontide a woman stays at home with heart haunted by jealousy.
At eventide she stays at home with heart haunted by sensuality and lust. These
are the three qualities … possessed of which womenfolk … are reborn in
Purgatory (in Paul 1985: 52–53).

Such beliefs about women were reiterated regularly by monastics. In
the following passage from a tape-recorded interview with a nun who
worked as a nurse before becoming a nun, she explains the preceding
passage in her own words:
Women have three kinds of bad minds. As soon as they get up in the morning,
they’re greedy. That’s the first point. They try to own all the things in the
world. Second, they get jealous easily. And third is sexual desire or dependent
minds. This means that women have a hunger for being protected or that women
lust after handsome men more than men lust after women.

Examples of women’s emotional failings are common in monastery
teachings and in everyday discourse. The Master often corrected nuns for
being emotional, and these stories were used to teach others. In one, the
Master observed that a nun who was proud that she no longer acted
emotionally was exhibiting pride, another emotion, and was therefore
acting emotional like a woman. Nuns regularly described the women in
their families, and themselves before they became nuns, as “ungenerous,”
“fragile,” “soft,” “tender,” and “emotional.” One well-educated nun who
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became a nun right after college, described the women in her family as well
as herself as “emotional”:
In my family all the women always feel agitated. Like when someone dies, we
feel sad, you know, like a girl. I had two sisters, and between the three of us,
our moods were manic-depressive. For example, during autumn, because the
wind blows and the leaves fall, women feel sad. Also, when we see old people,
we will feel sad if they’re sick and there’s nothing we can do. When I was in
college, I used to feel very upset every time I had to leave home to go back to
school.… Girls, like me and my sisters, cry and feel sad, but not men. Men are
steady in their emotions.

Another interviewee echoed this statement, saying, “women are more
emotional and sensitive. They think differently from men.”
At the monastery, women’s emotionality is thought to stem in part
from their bodies. A monk who worked at the monastery’s construction
office said:
Women originally suffer because of their bodies’ structures. Their lives are
harder because of this. For example, their monthly period is a hardship. Men
don’t have this problem; men are less likely to have physical problems….
Women also have more emotional problems. For example, if a woman is married
and has children, this is also a hardship.

While some stressed the physical origins of women’s emotionality,
most described women’s particularly strong ties to the world — the ties
they are supposed to break in order to become monastics — as the source
of their strong emotions. When still in the world, before renunciation, they
said they would often bear the emotional burdens of others because of their
ties. A senior nun who ran a branch temple told me about life before
becoming a monastic:
Before becoming a nun, I had a boyfriend for over four years and I felt whatever
he felt. If he was happy or sad, I felt it and it was a huge burden…. If you like
someone … you live for him. And I think this is a kind of burden, a kind of
suffering…. A person can be good for you for a while, but then be bad for you.

The emotional burdens of familial ties were particularly problematic
for women who had children before they decided to become monastics.
Although in theory one would not be allowed to bring one’s children to the
monastery, many children of nuns (and some monks) were also resident
monastics. Sometimes this was because once a child expressed an interest
in being a monk or nun, his or her parents would decide that one or both of
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them should also join the monastery. Sometimes the child followed the
parent who had made the decision first. Once at the monastery, their
parental role should end, as children live separately from adults; severing
family ties is the key element of renouncing the world and taking religious
vows. Sometimes this break was not clear, however, as was the case with
one nun, whose fifteen-year-old daughter was also a nun who befriended
me. This mother-nun had brought her entire family with her to the
monastery and, except for her husband (who regularly visited and
volunteered at the temple), all had become monastics (including her four
children, her siblings, her mother, and some of her aunts). Although she
had renounced her ties to the world, she often had to fulfill her familial
obligations, such as her role of mother to her children. She once
approached me about teaching her daughter English (as had many parents
when I previously lived in Taichung). As a monastic, she ideally should be
free of such obligations and their concomitant emotions (such as desire for
her child’s happiness and success).
Leaving one’s children behind does not guarantee a nun less emotional
pain — as the story of one nun, who left behind an eight-year-old daughter,
illustrates. “It took me more than two years to resolve to become a nun. It
was not an easy decision to make because I had a family…. I knew if I
came here it would hurt [my daughter]. Every time I thought about
becoming a nun, I would think of her and cry.” She ultimately concluded
that her fate was to join the monastery, and that if she did not, she would
regret it the rest of her life. “So I decided to give her up…. I loved her, and
I also worried about her. We were knotted together and never would be
untied since my feelings for her were very deep….When I first became a
nun, I’d think of her and cry.” However, she said that the pain of her
decision to become a nun has eased with time, and she no longer thinks of
her daughter as often. While she used to call regularly, she now thinks
remaining in contact does neither of them any good. Leaving behind
relationships, and the emotions that come from them, is necessary in order
for monastics to achieve their spiritual goals. Since monastics believe
women are more embroiled in relationships, they are thus more affected by
emotion. However, this can change after they break off relationships, and
have had time at the monastery, learning to feel emotions less.
Teachings and stories in the monastery regularly contrast exaggerated
stereotypes of women (as emotional creatures) with those of men (who are
better at not feeling emotions). Nuns frequently told me that they studied
the behavior of monks as a model for their own actions. They believed that
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from monks they could learn how to sit still for long periods and how to be
decisive, unafraid, and calm. While stoicism is the ideal for monastics, in
both appearance and in essence, this ideal is also masculine.

Cultivating Compassion
In this final section, I show that Taiwanese Buddhist monastics use
scarification as a means to reveal to the world that not only can they endure
physical pain stoically, but also that they have the compassion necessary to
fulfill the bodhisattva vow. Where a stoic countenance reveals that
Taiwanese monastics have progressed spiritually to the point where they
no longer are swayed by emotion, the scarification of their heads reveals
that they have the compassion necessary to endure the suffering of the
world. Enduring the pain of the scarification also effects a change in their
lived experience of emotion. To explore both the semantic and
transformative meanings of these scars, I examine them in light of recent
discussions of language and emotion which suggest that speaking about
emotions can be more than simply a reporting of an emotional state; the
statements themselves can be transformative — changing one’s way of
being in the world. Recent anthropological scholarship suggests that
speaking of emotions can take emotions from being individual and
idiosyncratic, and make them objective, general, and less forceful. I argue
that the reverse process is also true, that through scarification, an objective,
esoteric concept like compassion can be burned into the body, concretizing
and personalizing the feeling, and transforming scarred monastics’
experience of the emotion of compassion as well as their way of being in
the world.
Masculine Compassion
In addition to using the monks as a model for cultivating a stoic
appearance, the nuns also see in the monks a model of exhibiting the right
kind of feeling — compassion. For those more familiar with Western
traditions, the association of compassion with men may seem odd as it is
frequently seen as a feminine trait. In the West, masculine figures in myth
and fiction (especially paternal figures) tend to be cold and rational, and
feminine figures (especially maternal figures) are more often swayed by
compassion. In contemporary American discourse, some argue that more
women should be involved in public life because they are as capable as
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men; others argue that more women should be involved because they
possess traits that are believed to be unique to women. When the genders
are contrasted along this latter line of thought, men are described as quite
dispassionate, whereas women are more compassionate. In theory, this
compassion leads women in politics to work on children’s issues and to be
less inclined to send soldiers into battle. According to this theory, because
women have children (or because they are more nurturing), they are more
capable of feeling compassion than their more detached male counterparts.
The cibei (compassion) that is described at the monastery, unlike
Western compassion that is thought to be aided by feelings of connection
to family, is defined in contrast to the kinds of feelings that one has as a
mother or as a nurturer. Rather than causing her to feel compassion
broadly, the feelings that a woman has as a result of her connections to her
family are thought to be selfish, preventing her from feeling a broader
compassion for those outside her sphere. In this sense, women are
described as having “narrow hearts”7 in that, as one nun said, “a woman …
only cares about beauty, her own children, about a small world.” She
contrasted this with the compassion of a Buddhist monk who reaches
beyond his own circle and has “qualities like decency, purity; he has a pure
mind and does good for others.” One monk said that women are focused on
their own smaller worlds and more narrow-hearted in that they “tend to be
more jealous and envious [whereas] men’s hearts are bigger.” Although a
woman can feel for others, monastics believe that in general, a woman’s
emotions center on her own sphere and are therefore selfish — even when
her emotions are directed outward at someone else, that person tends still
to be within her own sphere. On the other hand, men’s compassion does not
distinguish between the feelings of oneself, those in one’s sphere, and
those outside it.
A woman’s lack of compassion is not thought to be a permanent
condition. The nuns believe they can study and learn from men’s examples
how to keep down their own personal emotions and instead feel a broader
compassion for humanity. Although women who are linked to the world
tend to have their emotions wrapped up in it, they believe, women who
detach from their own circles and personal emotions are able to develop
this masculine, compassionate characteristic. This detachment is felt to be
best accomplished by shedding one’s ties to the world and becoming a nun.
As one senior nun told me, “I feel I’ve changed a lot; my heart is more
open. Since becoming a nun, I feel happier toward others without
expecting anything back. I feel I’ve grown a compassionate heart.” Where

The Stoic Monastic: Taiwanese Buddhism and the Problem of Emotions

101

once she found herself embroiled in the emotions of her boyfriend and her
family, having detached herself from those ties she is now able to feel more
broadly compassionate to all.
As selfish emotion is typically associated with women and compassion
is typically associated with men, at the monastery, having overcome one’s
selfish emotions and developed a compassionate heart also means that one
is no longer thought to be a woman. In this context, women are defined by
their emotionality and a woman who has overcome this problem — one
who has accomplished the stoic appearance of a monastic and one who has
developed a compassionate heart — is described as a man. For example, as
one nun said, “We are women because we are greedy and noisy. If a female
is open-hearted, kind, and compassionate, then she is a great man [nanren]
of virtue.”
Nuns clearly alter their outward appearance and look like men not only
by copying their movements and their demeanor, but also by wearing the
same clothes as the monks and through the manly shaving of their heads.
Indeed, it can be very difficult to distinguish male monastics from female
monastics. This serves several purposes, one of the most significant being
that obscuring their gender will remove any sexual longing they could
arouse in monks or other males. This obscurity also aids nuns in selfidentifying as men, which serves to reinforce their change of character.
Outward appearances of stoic masculinity, though, are not as important as
having developed the selfless compassion of men. As one nun explains,
I don’t have hair and I don’t beautify myself, so physically, I’m more like a
man. But in Buddhism, we want a xin [heart/mind] like a man…. The xin is the
most important part, not the clothes and that stuff…. Do you have wisdom,
compassion, a calm inner state? If you have these three things then you can be
called a da zhangfu8 [heroic, or manly, man]…. When we vow to be da zhangfu,
that means we want to have wisdom, compassion, and a calm inner state like
the Buddha. Everyone can be a Buddha…. No matter if you are a man or a
woman you can be a Buddha.

This last point was central to much of the monastery’s teachings.
Although women are believed to be more emotional than men, monastics
believe no one is limited by their gender or any other condition; men and
women alike have within them the same Buddha nature. Although
monastics believe men may more easily feel compassion because they are
less enmeshed in the petty emotions of family life, they also believe that
women can extricate themselves from their families and learn to be more
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compassionate. Once women have started down this path, they are
understood to have become like men in their abilities, and are therefore
called men.
The Compassionate Bodhisattva
The fundamental goal of monastics is to become bodhisattvas. A
bodhisattva is someone who, through insight built on years of diligent
spiritual cultivation (or from a sudden inspiration) achieves the ability to
not be reincarnated. Though having freed him or her self from the wheel of
reincarnation, this is also someone who does not use this ability. A
bodhisattva is someone who vows not to leave the world until all sentient
beings also attain liberation. The bodhisattva’s willingness to take this vow
signals compassion for all living things and a willingness to forgo one’s
own reward for the sake of teaching and liberating others. At Zhi Guang
monastery, the bodhisattva vow is understood as expressing infinite
ambition; the number of sentient beings is practically immeasurable and
therefore the suffering one must thus undergo in order to help them all is
likewise limitless.
As part of the transformative experience, the day before one takes the
vows, a monastic undergoes a scar-burning ceremony in which three scars
are burned into the forehead, just above the hairline. This is done by
holding the lit end of incense sticks against the skin long enough to burn
three permanent, coin-sized scars. For several months after the ceremony,
the welt formed remains raised and covered with a scab. Occasionally lay
people undergo the ceremony and have the scars burned into their inner
elbows. One man I interviewed about the process said that it took more
than six months for his scars to heal and they remained quite painful the
entire time.
According to the monastery’s Master, burning the scar is an integral
part of the vow-taking process. In a speech he gave prior to the ceremony
in the late 1990s, he said that burning the scar indicates the novices’
yearning to attain spiritual goals. In this sense, it serves as a marker — a
sign to others that one is willing to undergo the limitless suffering
necessary to become (and be) a bodhisattva. It brands them, literally, as
having started the journey to becoming bodhisattvas. The Master says,
“The scars are a symbol of our yearning to liberate all beings. Burning the
body is an indication of willingness to endure the bodhisattva path.”
This visible sign of charred flesh represents one stage of spiritual
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advancement in which greater pain is inflicted upon more advanced
practitioners. At each level one is supposed to show no sign of emotion, but
instead should be motivated by compassion for others. The Master
illustrates these sentiments with the frequently repeated saying “(one
should make) the novice kneel in pain, beat the monk, and burn the
bodhisattva.” The ability to suffer through extensive, prolonged periods of
kneeling signals one’s ability to be a novice; enduring punches and slaps
signals one’s resilience as a monk; scars burned into the forehead signal
one’s advanced spiritual state as that of the compassionate bodhisattva. In
this ceremony, by enduring the suffering and transferring the merit of the
action to others, one has acted as a bodhisattva and exhibited compassion.
One enters the ceremony with a desire to become a bodhisattva but only a
hope that one has sufficient self-control and compassion to endure the
ceremony. By going through the ceremony, one’s identity shifts to that of
a bodhisattva. This is both signaled by and accomplished through the
burning of the scar. The transformation into a bodhisattva begins with the
pain willingly endured out of compassion for the suffering of others.
Why is the endurance of pain so important? Because merely stating
one’s vows, according to the Master, is not enough:
We can’t just say, “my thoughts are pure” or “my thoughts are those of a
Buddha.” Even if those statements are true, we need the action of burning to
concretize it or it will not remain so. Burning the scars gives shape to the formless,
shapeless path. Without it, we can’t fully understand the wisdom of the Buddha.

With this statement, the Master implies that pain itself seems to
communicate what language — what the words of the vows alone —
cannot. The pain “gives shape to the formless … path.” It signals to others
an ability and willingness to suffer. Much has been written about the
inability of words to communicate pain — that language cannot articulate
the sensations and meanings of pain (Scarry 1985). Pain is beyond
language. However, for the monastics I studied, pain seems not only to be
difficult to communicate but to be itself a system of communication that
communicates what language cannot.
Chan Buddhism emphasizes the notion that language cannot
communicate ultimate truths. While all religions deal with this limitation
of language in some form, for Chan, it is the central issue. This is
demonstrated by the use of gong’an (koan in Japanese), language puzzles
that promote insight by their seeming lack of sense. Perhaps the most
recognizable example of gong’an is “what is the sound of one hand
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clapping?” The student whose master has presented such a puzzle is not
supposed to answer the question directly, but rather to see the ultimate
nature of reality through the question’s unanswerable nature.
If language fails to communicate ultimate truths, then it makes sense
that the words of vows would feel empty, that proclaiming one’s desire to
be a bodhisattva would not be enough to accomplish the act. In this context,
actions certainly speak louder than words, but they also do more than
effectively communicate meaning. In this context, pain seems to convey
meanings words cannot articulate; it seems to function as another kind of
language.
The scarification part of the ceremony may be without language, but it
still seems to work much like one of J.L. Austin’s (1962) speech acts. To
explore the similarities, I turn now to recent literature that borrows from
Austin’s concept, to suggest that statements about emotion can be
performative as well as descriptive; I then explore the ways in which the
scarification ceremony may be similar to these statements.
“Emotives” and “From Being to Becoming”
In his book The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of
Emotions, William Reddy (2001) suggests a conceptual framework for
understanding what happens linguistically when the expression of emotion
effects a change in the world. Exploring the potential application of
Austin’s descriptions of “constantive” and “performative” statements to
statements about emotion, he finds that they fall short of capturing the true
nature of emotional statements. Although the categorization of statements
of emotion as constantive (along with statements like “I feel hungry”)
seems obvious, Reddy finds that the term does not quite fit — statements
about emotion can have an effect on the world, and therefore have
something in common with performatives, or statements that both cause
something to happen and make reference to that change. If a wedding
officiant says “I now pronounce you husband and wife,” that officiant
both transforms the status of the individuals involved from single to
married and announces the change. Although statements about emotion
appear merely to describe emotion (e.g. “I feel happy” appears to simply
describe the way the speaker feels), sometimes, like performatives, they
effect a change in the world. In this case, they change the speaker and his
or her feelings. To capture this potential of emotional statements, he calls
them “emotives.” Reddy describes emotives as having the power to cause
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the speaker to feel a heightened experience of the emotion he or she is
expressing (feeling happier for having described oneself as happy), or to
feel like a hypocrite if expressing a feeling he or she is not actually
experiencing.
Although she does not use Reddy’s language, in a recent article,
“From Being to Becoming: Nüshu and Sentiment in a Chinese Rural
Community,” Liu Fei-Wen (2004) explores the transformative effect of
emotional expression found in nüshu (Chinese literature written in
characters developed, and only used, by women). In this tradition, women
express their personal experiences of emotional pain — for example, their
feelings at being required to marry when terribly young, or to marry into a
family that lives far from their own — in laments that link their own
experiences to those of other women. Like Reddy, she suggests that to read
the articulation of emotions as if their sole purpose is to reveal what is
hidden inside is to miss a key aspect of what such statements accomplish.
Liu argues that the speaking of emotion can do much more than just
provide a statement about an emotion — it can change it:
Sentiment is not merely a carrier or marker of thought, power, or relationship
but is also a flow of energy that acts on and engages the protagonists. Sentiment
is not just part of human phenomenological experience but also plays an active
role in the way lives are felt, articulated, and reflected (2004: 424).

The ways that articulating emotions changes them can be understood
on the basic level of catharsis — by expressing emotion one reduces the
amount of pain inside. This transformation, though, can be even more
involved: “a complicated, dialectical process of building a new self that is
intersubjectively nurtured so as to overwrite one’s vulnerability” (2004:
430).
Where Reddy emphasizes the power of emotives to heighten feelings
(among other possibilities), Liu argues that in the process of articulating
them, the women she studied objectify and gain distance from powerful
emotions that are personal and idiosyncratic. To Liu, the expression of
feeling
may disentangle the tie between the sentiments felt and the subject who feels.
This is so because expression lays its foundation on a materialized basis …
and, thus, objectifies the sentiments. To objectify, by definition, one must stand
outside, which, in turn, creates an effect of alienation. Alienation then allows
transposition of a felt emotion from self into a third space, in this way rendering
terrible experiences bearable and manageable (2004: 430).
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As one of her informants says, expressing emotion toughens the skin
and makes it less susceptible (2004: 430).
Perhaps, to turn the concept of emotives around and the work of Reddy
and Liu on end, what happens in the scarification ceremony is something
akin to the reverse of what happens for the women in Liu’s study who use
language to create distance between themselves and their personal, painful
emotions. Where language allows Liu’s lamenters to objectify and distance
themselves from their pain, for the monastics in my study, pain is used to
take something — an objective, distant, and esoteric concept like
compassion — and make it a real, concrete, and powerful feeling that the
body experiences through pain. In this sense, burning the scars has the
opposite, but similarly transformative, effect of the laments of nüshu
because it takes something general, abstract, and impersonal — the concept
of compassion — and it makes it into a tangible bodily experience. The
perfect compassion of the bodhisattva (cibei) is an abstract, esoteric
concept and a difficult feeling to cultivate; cibei is a feeling quite different
from pity or empathy. Cibei is achieved when one has transcended ordinary
emotion and is able to feel for all sentient beings without discriminating. It
may be understood in theory, but as difficult as the concept may be to fully
grasp, it is that much harder to truly feel.
Where the meditation techniques described earlier enable monastics to
learn to feel less, when it comes to compassion, the point is to learn to feel
more. Although the bulk of their practice is focused on not experiencing
emotion, compassion — which may be easier to conceptualize than to
actually feel — is put into the body of monastics through the use of pain,
which makes the experience real and concrete. Unlike the women using the
laments of nüshu to voice their pain and thereby lessen it, with
scarification, the goal is to heighten the feeling. Through scarification, one
does the opposite of distancing and objectifying pain; pain is willingly
taken into the body. One of the lamenters described by Liu says that
lamenting toughened her skin and made it less susceptible; for monastics,
though, susceptibility to the feeling of compassion is seared into skin
through scarification.
In this ceremony, one willingly endures pain, and yet does not show
any reaction to the pain. One remains stoic, and yet the scars remain after
the ceremony — an emblem to those who see them of the compassion of
the monastic who bears them. The stoicism shown during the scarification
ritual reveals not a tremendous ability to restrain one’s emotions, but rather
a willingness to endure the limitless suffering of all sentient beings, a
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willingness born of deep compassion. The stoicism shown in this ritual
reflects mastery over one’s emotions, but also that one has accessed the
deeper, more profound trait of compassion.
Scars are semiotic in that they communicate the willingness of the
person to suffer on behalf of others in a way that is more powerful than
could be done with mere language. The scarification further serves to
create, heighten, or concretize the experience of compassion for monastics.
Finally, scarification further accomplishes the act of making one into a
bodhisattva; by enduring the pain and transferring the positive karmic
merit accrued through the ceremony to others, they have actually started
down the bodhisattva path. Although it does not use language, the
scarification ceremony is not unlike a speech act in that it both states
something and accomplishes it.

Conclusion
At Zhi Guang Shan, a stoic appearance and scars both hint at a complicated
understanding of emotions that lie below the monastics’ surface. Where
most other anthropological studies of emotional mastery suggest that in
other societies, it usually gains significance when a powerful emotion is
constrained beneath a stoic appearance, in this context, its significance is
quite the opposite. Because emotions disturb the calm state monastics need
in order to achieve spiritual goals, monastics need to do more than control
the appearance of emotion: they need to rid themselves of emotion
altogether. Stoicism reflects that one has achieved a high level of spiritual
cultivation. Stoicism shows that nuns have freed themselves from the petty
emotional concerns of their small personal spheres and that they have
compassion, like that of men. The outer appearance of stoicism reveals an
inner accomplishment of freedom from emotional swings. This appearance
is further reinforced with the scars of the bodhisattva vow, which reveal
that one’s own petty emotions, such as a desire to free oneself from pain,
have been replaced by compassion for the suffering of others.
This compassion does not necessarily come easily. It requires that
monastics distance themselves from self-concern and concern for only
their circle of family, friends, and associates and instead feel equally for
the whole world. The difficulty in feeling this emotion is overcome by the
use of pain to instill into the body and make concrete what would otherwise
be abstract. Scarring works the opposite of laments; rather than harden the
skin against a feeling, it enables the feeling to penetrate the skin. In the
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process of scarification, one also begins down the path of the bodhisattva
— in that moment, one begins suffering for others out of compassion,
which is the task of the bodhisattva. The scars also do what words cannot;
they tell of the depth of compassionate feeling the monastic has within —
compassion enough to not only vow to turn back from the escape that they
have earned from the wheel of reincarnation (and to bear limitless suffering
in the process), but also to undergo the current, physical suffering of the
scars themselves.

Notes
1. I wish to thank the Foundation for Scholarly Exchange in Taipei, Taiwan,
which funded the research for this project with a Fulbright grant. For insightful
comments on an earlier version of this paper, I thank Paul Brodwin and Asian
Anthropology’s anonymous reviewers. I also thank Shanshan Du for
thoughtful comments on the meaning of cibei, and, along with Paul DeBruler
and Molly Robertson, for providing feedback on various drafts.
2. One particularly well-traveled anthropologist commented to me that in other
parts of Asia, monastics seemed to be the most lighthearted members of their
communities. Indeed, I once met a Tibetan monk in Darjeeling who was
always smiling and was quite charming and funny. In the short time I was there
I encountered him a number of times on the street and in restaurants, and he
always had a quick remark or joke about why we kept running into each other.
Based on similar experiences as well as tales of monks who teach using gongan
(koans, or Zen riddles) in their teaching, I imagined my research to entail easily
entering a community of warmhearted people and, like my anthropologist
friend, I was initially surprised and put off by the stern look of most Taiwanese
monastics.
3. A pseudonym.
4. His actual term is “Faustian love.”
5. In the next section, I describe in greater detail the bodhisattva vow to remain
in the world despite having achieved liberation.
6. Appearing earnest and not distracted by ordinary fun is particularly important
in Taiwan where historical stereotypes and a few notorious present-day
examples cause the general populace to doubt the sincerity of monastics. In a
cultural context where filial piety is central to morality, the choice to chujia, to
leave home and renounce one’s ties to one’s family, is morally suspect. Indeed
as historian Susan Mann has demonstrated, in Qing era China, monks and nuns
were suspected of licentious acts and leading morally debauched lives, and
accused of leading otherwise decent women out of seclusion and into
monasteries where they were said to participate in orgies (Mann 1997: 195). A
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popular expression of the era posited that of every ten nuns, nine were
prostitutes and the other was mad.
Strains of this image persist in Taiwan, where most lay people I spoke with
believed that most of those who choose the renunciant’s life do so because they
have no other choice. The image of monastics has recently improved
somewhat, aided by the reserved public demeanors of monastics, but recent
scandals and a few prominent figures have prevented the image from being
completely redeemed. Part of the problem, particularly for nuns, is a recurring
character type in historical dramas on television. These women (who one nun
I spoke with called “silly nigus” – nigu being a traditional word for “nun”
which has fallen out of favor largely because of these images), who are
ostensibly nuns, act in ways monastics (and the larger Taiwanese community)
find both silly — running, shouting, giggling, manipulating people and flirting
— and immoral. One woman in particular (who shaved her head and dressed
like a nun but whose credentials some of the people I spoke with in Taichung
doubted) regularly appears on Taiwanese game shows, singing and acting in
skits. This behavior clearly violates many monastic precepts and undermines
the carefully constructed image of self-control that most monastics cultivate.
The monastic image has also been affected by recent scandals, which have
shown some monks to be con-artists, doctoring photos to show their bodies
emitting light or hovering mid-air and swindling unsuspecting lay people out
of millions of Taiwanese dollars. Even otherwise famous and respected leaders
of large temples have been accused of brainwashing large groups into
becoming monastics against their will and getting excessively involved not
only in Taiwanese politics, but American politics as well.
7. The term xin can mean “heart” or “mind.” I follow Margery Wolf (1985) and
Hill Gates (1987) in translating this phrase as “narrow-hearted,” because I
don’t believe the monastics are intending to say “narrow-minded.” This
expression is juxtaposed with having compassion rather than with having an
open mind.
8. Nuns frequently used da zhangfu to describe the monastic ideal. Although it is
held up as a model for both monks and nuns, it has specific masculine
connotations (Levering 1992), and should not be read as a genderless ideal.
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